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Abstract
This paper provides a risk-based framework for deciding on which IT services to outsource
and which to keep in-house. This framework considers the probabilities both of negative
outcomes, and of failing to achieve positive outcomes. The authors examine the major
components of outsourcing risk and their drivers, and from this derive a series of questions
decision-makers can ask when deciding what sourcing options to adopt for different services.
The framework was developed on the basis of five years of qualitative and quantitative
research into the experiences of organizations involved in outsourcing IT.
Keywords
Outsourcing, risk, decision framework, selective outsourcing.

Introduction
One important decision when developing an IT strategy is how to source the various IT
services needed by an organization. While many sourcing strategies are available, the
decision-maker is ultimately confronted with two choices. The organization may manage,
control and coordinate the delivery of an IT service internally (whether services are
performed by internal staff, or contract staff under the organisation’s control). Alternatively,
it may delegate this management to an external provider who is responsible for specified
outcomes. The label “outsourced” is applied to situations where this management is
devolved.
Outsourcing of IT services is now widely promoted by both vendors and consultants, yet
empirical research has revealed large-scale dissatisfaction and the frequent failure to achieve
the financial and strategic goals set for it (Rouse, 2002; Gartner, 2002). In light of this,
choosing when and what to outsource, and subsequently, how to evaluate alternatives to
outsourcing, have become key issues for IT decision-makers. There are several models and
rules of thumb available. Some are appealingly simple, such as “don’t outsource strategic
services – outsource commodities”. We found that, in practice, these were unhelpful, because
of the difficulty in determining what is “strategic” and what is “commodity”. Other rules of
thumb, such as those based on transaction cost economic (TCE) theory (Williamson, 1975) or
agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1985), are complex, and simple decision-rules based on these
theories often downplay important variables like complexity, uncertainty, and market depth.
Still other decision-rules emphasize competitive positioning (Lacity, Willcocks & Feeny,
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1995; 1996) – an important issues for commercial organizations, but less so in the not-forprofit and public sectors.
In this paper we approach the choice of services to outsource from a risk-based perspective,
and present a framework and a set of questions managers in the field can ask when evaluating
candidate IT services to outsource.

Research method and data sources
This framework draws on existing theory, as well as a series of qualitative and quantitative
studies we have done over the last five years. These include a survey of 240 medium to large
government and non-government purchasers of IT servicesi (described in Rouse, 2002); a
longitudinal case study of the Federal Government’s IT outsourcing arrangements (Rouse &
Corbitt, 2002); and 16 focus group interviews with vendors and managers involved in
selecting IT services to outsource (Rouse, 2002).
Our qualitative informants (from the case studies and focus groups) included both public and
private sector purchasers of IT services, and ranged from those with over 7 years experience
of outsourcing to those evaluating sourcing options for the first time. The organizations they
represented ranged in size from relatively small (50 “seats”) to very large (2000+ “seats”).
As part of a wide-ranging discussion with these informants on their outsourcing experiences,
we asked them to identify problems they were experiencing with selecting IT services to
outsource, and what their experiences were once they did outsource. It is from their responses
that we developed our framework. The approach we used to analyse the data was
hermeneutic analysis (c.f. Lee, 1994). Full details of the analysis strategies are discussed in
Rouse (2002).

The issue of criteria
A key issue for decision-makers when choosing the best sourcing strategy for different IT
services is “what is the criteria to be optimised?” Most of the existing decision frameworks
address the services-choice in efficiency terms: i.e. “Which strategy is likely to lead to the
lowest cost?”. This approach assumes that services are held constant; whereas our research
revealed that different options may deliver quite different levels of services, with consequent
impacts on organizational performance.
Outsourcing is now carried out for many different reasons and decision-makers typically need
to choose between competing objectives. In particular, the need to conserve organizational
and managerial attention (so that it can be redirected to the organization’s core competencies)
is now well recognized, while the rapid changes in markets and technologies highlight the
importance of scalability, flexibility and organizational agility. In many cases, the
maximisation of these can conflict with the need to conserve financial resources, so the
usefulness of decision-rules based just on cost savings is limited.
Another problem with efficiency-based decision rules is that they are essentially abstract. The
decision-rule might predict that certain courses of action will lead to greater efficiency in the
long run. However, the prediction may be undermined when decision makers receive bids
from vendors and proceed to cost alternatives. In essence “tangible” financial figures crowd
out theoretical considerations. Yet these “tangible” figures are not risk or error free. A
number of respondents reported that their decision-making was overly optimistic. When
presented with a seemingly attractive service/cost ratio, decision-makers chose a sourcing
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strategy (usually outsourcing) on the basis of a “best case scenario” without considering the
probabilities either of attaining the expected service/cost goals, or of experiencing critical
negative consequences.
This perhaps explains why so few quantitative studies have been able to substantiate the
benefits promoted for outsourcing. In our survey, only one in three (36%) outsourcing
arrangements were reported as satisfactory by the survey respondents, and structural equation
modelling revealed the negative outcomes were largely due to the failure to achieve cost
savings and other strategic benefits (Rouse et al, 2001). The likelihood of not obtain expected
cost savings expected from outsourcing IT was high, with only 42% of respondents reporting
any savings at all, and only 7% reporting substantial savings. In our qualitative research, both
vendor and client informants described many situations where vendors deliberately or
unconsciously underbid the outsourcing contract. Kern et al (2002) label bids won in these
circumstances the “winner’s curse” because vendor and client tend, in the long run, to suffer
substantially. Given the apparently widespread practice of underbidding, treating financial
projections at face value, without taking into account the risk that they won’t eventuate, or the
risk of service degradation, is likely to lead to poor decision outcomes.

Minimizing risk in outsourcing
These observations led us to reframe the choice of which services to outsource in terms of
risk minimisation, rather than efficiency. The positive benefits of IT outsourcing – such as
organizational flexibility and agility, cost reductions, and the capacity to redirect attention
and resources to core competencies – are extensively promoted by vendors, and by
consultants who often derive substantial outsourcing-related income. Discussion of risks and
downsides is generally left to academics and researchers. Yet the choice of which services to
outsource and which to retain in-house depends on the interplay between benefits and risks.
For each potential outsourcing contract the various risks must be weighed against the likely
outsourcing benefits.
Both potential benefits and risks are probabilistic, and herein lies a problem – if decision
makers are misinformed about the likelihood either of benefits, or of negative consequences,
this weighing up will be faulty. Estimating probabilities and the negative impacts of a
decision is a core aspect of risk management, but it is less common to consider the
probabilities of achieving benefits (or conversely, of failing to achieve these). The
outsourcing literature is characterized by little probabilistic research into the extent of risks,
partly because most outsourcing research has been based on statistically unrepresentative case
studies. While many of these cases experienced poor outcomes from outsourcing, their
singularity means they provide no data on the extent of risks in the wider community.
For the same reason, there is limited information available on the extent to which expected
benefits fail to materialize; although the spate of recent studies reporting widespread
dissatisfaction with IT outsourcing (including Rouse et al, 2001 and Gartner, 2003) provides
evidence that this failure is commonplace. Given the intense effort required to investigate
and adequately plan for IT outsourcing, the failure to achieve expected benefits is important,
as the resources devoted to outsourcing have a substantial opportunity cost. Consequently, the
extent to which expected benefits do not eventuate represents a significant risk associated
with the endeavour.
Practitioners and academics have articulated the risks of IT outsourcing for over a decade.
These will vary in magnitude and impact on the organization, and may include immediate,
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local consequences (such as the failure to roll out a planned desktop upgrade, for example) as
well as subsequent and longer-term negative effects on organizational performance. The most
obvious risk is that cost savings projections are not achieved. Other IT outsourcing risks
highlighted by case study and theoretical literature (particularly Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993,
1995; Earl, 1996; Lacity & Willcocks, 2001; and Rouse, 2002) include:
• Service degradation, with consequent impacts on organizational performance;
• Being locked into higher-than-market cost structures, or obsolete technology;
• Additional unforseen costs of ensuring compliance, negotiation, and litigation;
• Organizational disruption and additional costs of poor transition;
• Vendor related risks (e.g. vendor overselling its capabilities; vendor going out of business
or walking away from that market; vendor failing to protect records; vendor
unresponsiveness);
• “Lock in” (where the purchaser has no option but to continue with an unsatisfactory
arrangement);
• Diversion of managerial attention and resources (away from core business);
• Inflexibility (due to contractual constraints or prohibitive amendment costs);
• Downstream organizational losses (loss of skills and tacit knowledge - and capacity to
exploit IT for business advantage, loss of innovative capacity; loss of intellectual
property);
• Impacts on competitive advantage.
While careful contracting might mitigate some of these risks, they can rarely be avoided
completely.

Components of risk
Analysis of our focus group interviews indicates that three key dimensions either increased
the likelihood of negative consequences, or decreased the likelihood of achieving the benefits
expected from outsourcing. These are similar to dimensions identified in the Transaction Cost
literature of the seventies and eighties (Williamson, 1975; 1985):
1. Level of uncertainty
2. Level of complexity
3. Potential for opportunistic behaviours

1. Uncertainty
Sourcing decisions, which require managers to analyse alternative cost streams for services to
be delivered in the future, inevitably incorporate substantial uncertainty. The essence of the
contractual relationship lies in attempts by both the vendor and client to project what will
occur over the life of the contract (and beyond) in order to agree on a mutually satisfactory
exchange. Unfortunately, our studies reveal that levels of uncertainty involved in the
outsourcing of IT services are much higher than for other services used as exemplars of
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satisfactory outsourcing - cleaning, catering, or refuse collection (Domberger, 1998). Yet this
uncertainty is rarely reflected in benefit/cost analyses.
The economic arguments for outsourcing IT assume that the purchaser and provider can
largely foresee, codify, and cost the services that will be required by the purchaser, during the
life of the contract. “Best practice” advice (e.g. Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; 1995; Lacity
and Willcocks, 2001) demands a detailed contract that describes the services, fees, and
penalties that will occur during a foreseeable future, and assumes that these projections are
relatively accurate. To the extent that this idealized situation can be approximated, decisionmaking becomes a matter of comparing cash flows over time for alternative service-delivery
strategies. Our research indicates, however, that even in a situation of relative predictability
such comparisons are not easy, as they involve high levels of uncertainty when issues of
projected volumes, timing, and even taxation treatment, are considered. Our study of the
Federal Government’s outsourcing experiences confirmed that even when detailed financial
analysis is carried out, business case estimates of the savings produced by outsourcing IT can
be overstated by a factor of 100%. Issues of legal and taxation interpretations can further
compromise benefit/cost projects (Rouse & Corbitt, 2002).
Our case studies (Rouse & Corbitt, 2002) also reveal that in situations of only moderate
uncertainty a complex, detailed contract decreased organizational flexibility and dramatically
increased the level of managerial attention needed to govern the outsourcing relationship.
Many line managers in the Federal Government agencies found that, rather than letting them
concentrate on their core business, outsourcing was a major distraction that forced them to
pay attention to issues that were previously handled smoothly because of common
understandings with their internal delivery function. They are not alone, less than 40% of the
240 Australian organizations we surveyed reported that they could concentrate more on their
core business as a result of outsourcing – yet this benefit is promoted as the most attractive
for outsourcing.
Like earlier researchers (Lacity & Hirschheim 1993; 1995; Willcocks & Fitzgerald, 1994) we
concluded that outsourcing services will succeed to the extent that decision-makers can
reduce the uncertainty involved in predicting and articulating the required services, volumes,
and likely delivery costs. However, our informants revealed that in many cases their capacity
to accurately forecast these aspects was poor. Some reasons for this are discussed below.

2. Complexity
The sheer number of elements involved in complex undertakings means that they are difficult
to comprehend, and this is a source of error if systems for managing complexity fail.
Processes for improving systems development success through project management and
control of details are grounded in this observation, as are strategies such as breaking down
outsourcing arrangements into small, manageable subprojects that can be more easily
evaluated and managed. But we observed errors and problems even with detailed, highly
structured outsourcing projects. In situations of complexity the combinatorial explosion of
these potential interactions can quickly magnify small individual risks into large, compound
risks. Risk is magnified, rather than just accumulated.

3. Potential for opportunistic behaviour
Opportunistic behaviour has been described (Williamson, 1985) as self-seeking with
deception (or guile). It occurs in outsourcing when one party exploits, to its own ends,
7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia

Page

931

Rouse, A. & Corbitt, B.

Minimizing Risks in IT Outsourcing

information not held by the other party, or the other party’s inflexibility or vulnerability. The
extent to which such behaviour is likely is a critical component of outsourcing risk, and has
received considerable attention in earlier research (eg Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993; 1995).

Drivers of opportunism, uncertainty and complexity
We identified a number of drivers that increase the three key dimensions of risk:
opportunism, uncertainty, and complexity. By considering these drivers, decision makers can
more accurately choose which IT services to keep in-house, and which to outsource. These
drivers, and the relationships between them, are summarised in Figure 1.
Market
depth
Potential for
opportunism
Level of
standardization

Technical
maturity
Uncertainty

Risk

Clarity of
requirements
Impact of
Scope

failure
Complexity

Interdependence

Points of

Technological

responsibility

complexity

Figure 1: Facets and drivers of IT outsourcing risks
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Drivers of opportunism
Market depth
In outsourcing, opportunism on the part of the vendor is likely to occur when the client
becomes dependent, either because of switching costs; a substantial mismatch in knowledge
and information (information asymmetry); or because there are too few vendors in the
marketplace to ensure competition (lack of market depth). In the Australian IT marketplace,
such circumstances occur frequently, and lack of market depth exacerbates other sources of
dependency.
Our informants revealed many instances where they were continuing with unsatisfactory
arrangements because the organization could not face the financial or organizational costs of
changing vendors. In one Government agency this had forced the purchaser to extend the
original contract three times, not because management were satisfied, but because they could
not afford the organizational disruption involved in switching vendors. Since there was no
competitive pressure on the vendor, the contract prices paid by this purchaser on renewal
were substantially higher than market prices.
Not all our respondents reported this level of “lock in” but many were involved in
unsatisfactory arrangements that were difficult to get out of. Several (purchaser) informants
reported that at contract end they could not attract bids from alternative vendors. Some also
reported their incumbent vendors were claiming that as a result of initial underbidding, they
expected to raise prices 30 to 40% when the contract came up for renegotiation, even though
historically technological changes have led to cost reductions. Having disbanded their internal
delivery capability, these purchasers reported that they felt held to ransom by their vendor, as
the time and investment associated with re-establishing the capability were prohibitive. It is
noteworthy that a number of the existing large government IT outsourcing contracts
(including the South Australian Government and many Federal agencies) are now moving
away from single-vendor outsourcing to a multiple-vendor, multiple-contract strategy. While
such a strategy will almost certainly involve substantial increases in transaction and
coordination costs, it has become necessary because of lack of competition in the Tier 1
vendor marketplace.
Level of standardization
Transaction Cost Theory (Williamson, 1975; 1985) argues that because of the likelihood of
opportunism, outsourcing is economically unattractive for tailored services, and our research
supported this. Informants involved in outsourcing standard service components (like
network wiring, hardware support, and the support of simple desktop environments) generally
reported greater levels of satisfaction and higher levels of perceived control. There is a
relatively robust and reliable vendor market in Australia for these services, with a pool of
skilled staff in the employment marketplace. On the other hand, purchasers of complex
infrastructure arrangements that were tailored to the purchaser’s needs  particularly those
that involved multi-tier architectures, integration of legacy systems with desktop
environments, or where security was important  often reported that services provided by
vendors were inadequate and costly.
For standardized, mature services there was also a robust body of expert consultants from
whom purchasers could seek advice and information. This helped purchasers avoid the
problems of information asymmetry, a situation that also leads to opportunism. In
7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia
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circumstances where technologies were rapidly evolving vendors had substantially more
technical and pricing knowledge than most purchasers. Many purchasers felt their vendors
exploited this information asymmetry. Other purchasers in these circumstances hired external
consultants to advise them, but this added substantial costs that destroyed their original
benefit/cost business case. Despite the risks of opportunism associated with information
asymmetry, most of our informants (and the large majority - 72% - of those in the survey)
were outsourcing to obtain skills and expertise they did not have available in house – a
situation almost certain to lead to asymmetry.
A common strategy used by informants to mitigate information asymmetry was
benchmarking. Our research revealed that those who spent money on benchmarking had
statistically discernable improvements in vendor service, and strategic and technical benefits,
as well as lower costs (Rouse, 2002). Our qualitative research, though, revealed that while
benchmarking was necessary, the costs and limitations were significant. High-level industrybenchmarks were too general to reveal true comparisons, and in many cases unless they
actually market tested, purchasers found it difficult to establish with any accuracy what
“market prices” were for the services they required. Yet a detailed market testing exercise
consumes substantial levels of organizational resources (including managerial attention), and
benchmarking is really only possible for services already widespread, and standardized, in the
community. The inability to accurately determine how efficient the internal delivery group
actually was meant that decision rules, like those of Lacity et al (1995; 1996) that relied on
relative efficiency (lagging vs. leading practices) were less helpful than expected.

Drivers of uncertainty
Technical maturity
In a classic paper, McFarlan (1981) identified two key source of uncertainty in IT projects
that have implications for IT outsourcing. The first, technological uncertainty, is associated
with the technological maturity of the client organization. In relation to outsourcing,
technologies might be “immature” because:
•

the technology is rapidly evolving,

•

the marketplace has not yet stabilized, or

•

the technologies are new to the organization.

Our research leads us to conclude that lack of technological maturity was a critical reason for
the widespread dissatisfaction reported for outsourcing. Many informants reported particular
problems with complex inter-networked desktop platforms and n-tier e-business technologies.
Specifying and evaluating such technologies (in a situation of rapid technological evolution)
was difficult for most, leading to substantial problems and cost escalations.
In contrast, where the services outsourced were well understood and technically mature, such
as 1970’s and 1980’s mainframe services, or relatively simple standardized desktop platforms
and networks, outsourcing was more successful. In these circumstances, purchasers were
able to clearly articulate their requirements and standards, knew how to evaluate service
quality, and could diagnose common service failures.

7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia

Page

934

Rouse, A. & Corbitt, B.

Minimizing Risks in IT Outsourcing

Clarity of requirements
A second source of uncertainty reported by McFarlan was related to requirements. Our
informants identified several reasons why a high level of requirements uncertainty exists in
outsourcing arrangements. Sometimes their organizations had no practical experience of the
features a new IT system or service was to provide, particularly if these involved novel
technologies. Consequently those specifying requirements were largely relying on
imagination. In such cases the client’s initial experiences of the system or service inevitably
changed their understanding of what was required, leading to expensive variations in the
contract. Other organizations knew at an abstract level what was needed, but could not
articulate the detailed requirements and performance levels expected because they no longer
had staff experienced at an operational level with the technologies. This resulted in
specifications that were ambiguous, and as a result to disputes requiring a high level of
managerial attention.
Uncertainty also arose when there were widely divergent views in the organization about
future requirements, and the priorities to be assigned to them. Several informants reported
situations where individual organizational units were clear about their own requirements, but
there was no agreed corporate priority. In these cases, the requirements changed depending
on the political power and influence of different organizational units.
These problems were exacerbated when business requirements were evolving rapidly. In the
public sector agencies we studied, frequent changes in policy requirements, and the
machinery of government, often dictated radical changes in service requirements. In private
sector organizations, mergers/acquisitions and new business strategies had the same effect. In
such circumstances the use of legal contracts and control processes became inflexible and
expensive. Our case studies and survey data suggest that organizations significantly underestimated the level of organizational change they would encounter. This had major
implications for their optimistic financial projections.
Uncertainty was compounded when services were provided on a time and materials, or fulltime-equivalent (FTE) staffing basis. While outsourcing is promoted as an outcome-based
delivery model, many of our informants could only forecast some services (such as analysis
and design, or specialist technical services) by the hour or manday. In these circumstances,
predicting final costs was difficult, and there were opportunities for vendors to exploit the
situation.

Drivers of complexity
Scope
The scope of an outsourcing arrangement affects its complexity. Several of our case studies
involved large-scale outsourcing arrangements, and without exception, these were complex,
difficult to manage, and major drains on the management attention in the organization, even
though they were not necessarily financial failures (Rouse & Corbitt, 2002). Despite their
scope, these arrangements involved what has been described as “selective” outsourcing
(Lacity & Willcocks, 1996), as purchasers outsourced only about half the IT budget.
Conversely, we found examples of smaller organizations successfully outsourcing almost all
their IT services (based on standardized environments) to a single vendor (that is, “total”
outsourcing). These arrangements were relatively low in complexity, even though they met
Lacity et al’s definition of “total” outsourcing. Our research suggests that the failures of the
7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia
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“total outsourcing” cases studied by Lacity and Hirschheim (1995)  the source of Lacity
and Willcocks’ 1998, data  was related to their complexity, not to the extent of IT budget
outsourced.
Interdependence
Because of the pervasive nature of IT services, most of our informants reported that their
operational activities were highly dependent on their outsourced services. Consequently “best
practice” advice to outsource only services that are relatively quarantined from other business
processes (Lacity et al, 1995; 1996) was not feasible. Many reported that managing business
processes dependent on outsourced services was more difficult than managing those
dependent on services delivered in-house, because the formality of control processes for
outsourcing reduced responsiveness. Situations that would have been handled in-house with a
brief internal discussion often escalated into major administrative headaches. The problems
of interdependence are magnified when an outsourced arrangement in place.
Points of responsibility
Our informants also reported that complexity increased substantially when the number of
“points of responsibility” increased. Many, after experiencing vendor problems with a primecontractor or single-vendor model, had adopted, or were contemplating moving to, a
multiple-contractor strategy. Such a strategy was strongly encouraged by the consultants and
experts they relied upon. However, those who had adopted this strategy reported that having
multiple vendors increased contractual and managerial complexity considerably. Multiplevendor arrangements also substantially increased contractual and coordination costs
(transaction costs), particularly for small purchaser organizations, and tended to decrease the
influence purchasers had with individual vendors.
Another source of “points of
responsibility” complexity was the process of clustering, or grouping relatively disparate
organizational units to gain economies of scale. In the Federal IT outsourcing case (reported
in Rouse & Corbitt, 2002) clustering was economically successful, but was abandoned
because of the operational trade offs required, and the increased demands on managerial time.
Technological Complexity
Many of our informants’ organizations had complex technical environments, which proved
problematic when outsourced. A typical purchaser might have several networked desktop
operating environments, multiple servers running different operating systems and different
applications tailored to the organization’s needs, some multi-tier e-business and Internetbased systems, and sometimes legacy systems based on outdated software environments.
Diagnosis of problems in these circumstances is difficult, and our informants often reported
that a single vendor could not adequately support their environment. This led to difficulties
and disputes when multiple vendors were involved. There was a marked contrast between the
technical environments in our informants’ organizations and those of the highly publicized
early IT outsourcing success stories. While large in scope, those involved relatively low
levels of technical complexity  a single-vendor and homogeneous mainframe environment
that preceded the Internet, n-tier client-server, and desktop environments of the mid to late
90s.
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A consolidated framework of selection risk
We found that many of these drivers were interrelated. For example, outsourcing of
technically immature services affected both uncertainty (through inability to specify and
measure outcomes) and opportunism (through lack of standardization). Conversely, when the
service outsourced was highly standardized, many risks could be overcome because the
standardized requirements meant there was generally a large body of purchasers with
common needs, and as a consequence a deeper and more vigorous vendor marketplace.
Informants with largely standard requirements believed that they could easily move to an
alternative supplier, and so were willing to outsource services that were integral to their
business. They also had the option, if necessary, of re-insourcing the service, as the pool of
skilled staff in the employment market was high.
This interrelation is reflected in the framework shown in Figure 1 where technological
maturity tends to lead to standardization, which creates a greater pool of customers, and
hence deeper marketplace of vendors. At the same time, technological maturity also leads to
less uncertainty as requirements are easier to specify and performance is more easily
measured. Figure 1 also incorporates the impact of failure, as this will have an important
moderating effect on the level of risk.

Evaluating the Risks for Candidate Services
The discussion above highlights a range of factors that decision-makers can consider when
choosing alternative sourcing strategies for individual services. Where the likelihood of
opportunism, uncertainty, or complexity is high, purchasers need to be convinced that the
benefits of an outsourcing strategy (whether outsourcing as part of a traditional arrangement
or a “best sourcing” arrangement) justify the high levels of risk. In such cases alternatives
such as retaining the services in-house, or hiring in contractors are likely to reduce risks, even
though these options may on the surface appear to be more expensive. Conversely, where
services are likely to involve only moderate levels of these three aspects of risk, decisionmakers can feel more confident that the cost/benefit projections they make when bids are
received are likely to be achieved.
In Table 1 below, the elements of the framework shown in Figure 1 are applied. The table
provides a series of questions purchasers can ask when evaluating the likely risks of particular
outsourcing ventures, or when choosing whether or not a particular IT service is a good
candidate for outsourcing.

Risk Factor

Key questions for purchaser

Low level of
standardization

For this IT service, how willing is your organization to trade off unique requirements for the
benefits of standardization?
How well-codified is the service delivery process, and how widely is process-knowledge
distributed in the community?

Shallow market
depth

How many viable players are in the marketplace now; how many likely at contract end?
What are the switching costs (financial, organizational) associated with moving to an
alternative supplier? What are the lead times?
What is your capacity to re-insource the services if necessary?
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Do market standards exist; how stable are they?
What is your organization’s technical maturity in delivering these services previously - so
how well can you specify requirements and service levels?
How familiar is your organization with this IT service - hence your capacity to evaluate
performance quality?
What is your vendor’s track record for delivering this particular service?
What is your own organization’s experience at managing outsourced IT services?
What is your organization’s capacity to clearly articulate the requirements and the service
levels to be provided?
How much agreement is there within your organization about service levels and measures?
About priorities?
Are you demanding competing requirements (eg flexibility or industry development vs.
reduced costs)?

Interdependence

How many other technologies in your organization interface with the technologies involved
in delivering this IT service?
How many business processes depend on this IT service?
How tightly are your business processes coupled with this IT service?

Potential for
opportunism

To what extent are the services you require standardized (asset non specific) and common to
many purchasers in the marketplace?
To what extent does your access to information and advice about these IT services match
those of the vendor?
To what extent does your access to information and advice about how to manage an
outsourced arrangement match those of the vendor?

Uncertainty

How likely are substantial changes to service requirements over the life of the contract? To
volume changes?

Complexity

How many different processors, operating systems, and operating system versions are
involved?
How many different applications and software environments?
How many independent organizational units are involved in the purchase?
How many “points of responsibility” for delivery are there?
How many telecommunications environments?
How many applications that do not use a common user interface?

Impact of
failure

How many critical business processes would be affected if there was a service delivery
failure?
How serious would the consequences of failure be on business operations, customers,
privacy, or other legislative obligations?
How long could your organisation go without delivery of this IT service? With substantially
degraded service?
What are the (short term) cost implications of service degradation, or of major changes to
your cost/benefit projections?
What would be the longer-term impacts on your competitiveness of continual poor service?

Table 1: Risk factors to consider when evaluating IT services to outsource

Conclusion
The risk-based analytical framework we have developed, and the questions provided in Table
1 expand and clarify existing decision frameworks, and act as a focus for the thinking that
purchasers need to do before deciding on the best sourcing option. This risk framework also
helped us make sense of the sometimes-confusing messages we received from our focus
group and case study participants. Those services where focus group informants reported
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substantial cost savings and satisfaction (equipment support, installation and maintenance of
networks, mainframe hosting, and basic support of generic software products) are generally
low in the risk characteristics highlighted in Figure 1. They are well understood and involve
highly standardized processes, with the consequence that purchasers are able to readily
specify the outcomes required, and the standards expected. Such services are also technically
mature and stable – often involving technologies or processes developed 20+ years earlier. In
some areas where the technologies are quite recent (eg web hosting) – the growing
convergence of Internet based standards has resulted in a range of newly standardized
products and knowledge-promulgation. As a consequence of these characteristics, there are
robust vendor marketplaces, providing a check against opportunism and vendor lock-in.
However, few IT services are such clear candidates for outsourcing. Most involve one or
more risks highlighted in Figure 1, signalling the need for critical evaluation on the part of
decision makers. The evidence from our converging studies is that in most cases, outsourcing
will involve trade offs amongst the various success criteria discussed earlier in the paper, as
well as trade offs between different sources of risk. Table 1 can assist decision makers to
recognize and choose among these tradeoffs, and thus to increase their chances of a
satisfactory IT outsourcing arrangement. The framework also provides guidelines for
purchasers who have no choice but to outsource, because they do not have the internal
capacity to deliver an IT service, and do not have the time or resources to build it. By
minimizing the various risk factors shown in Table 1(by, for example, adopting highly
standardized requirements), and by recognizing the cost implications of these risks in their
business cases, such purchasers are less likely to be unpleasantly surprised.
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The survey described here was conducted by a team comprising the University of Melbourne, Oxford Institute
of Information Management and Deloitte Consulting, under the direction of Dr. Peter Seddon of the University
of Melbourne. Analysis of the data was conducted by the authors of this paper, one of whom was a member of
the survey team.
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